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The  behavior  of  small  time  and  savings  deposits  at 
commercial  banks,  savings  and  loan  associations,  and 
mutual  savings  banks  is  a matter  of  widespread  inter- 
est  for  a  number  of  reasons.  Part  or  all  of  these 
deposits  are  included  in  various  monetary  aggregates, 
which  are  widely  viewed  as  important  determinants 
of  economic  activity  and  play  an  important  role  in 
the  formulation  of  monetary  policy  under  current 
Federal  Reserve  operating  procedures.  In  addition, 
many  observers  feel  these  deposits  have  a  significant 
impact  on  the  performance  of  the  housing  industry. 
Finally,  the  behavior  of  these  deposits  directly  affects 
the  financial  health  of  savings  and  loan  associations 
and  mutual  savings  banks. 
This  article  examines  the  behavior  of  savings  de- 
posits  and  small  time  deposits  of  less  than  $100,000 
at  commercial  banks  and  the  thrift  institutions  (sav- 
ings  and  loan  associations  and  mutual  savings  banks) 
in  recent  years.  Savings  deposits  are  time  deposits 
on  which  30  days’  notice  may  be  required  prior  to 
withdrawal.  In  practice,  however,  such  notice  is 
seldom  enforced  and  these  deposits  can  be  withdrawn 
on  demand  without  penalty.  Other  small  time  de- 
posits  have  maturities  ranging  up  to  several  years 
and  are  subject  to  substantial  interest  forfeiture 
penalties  if  withdrawn  prior  to  maturity. 
The  Federal  Reserve  Board  sets  interest  rate  ceil- 
ings  on  these  deposits  at  member  banks  under  Regu- 
lation  Q  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Act.  The  Federal 
Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  and  the  Federal 
Home  Loan  Bank  Board-in  coordination  with  the 
Federal  Reserve  Board-set  Federal  ceilings  on  de- 
posits  at  federally  insured  nonmember  banks,  sav- 
ings  and  loan  associations,  and  mutual  savings  banks. 
As  will  be  shown  in  detail  later  in  the  article,  the 
movement  of  small  time  and  savings  deposits  is 
closely  related  to  movements  in  market  interest  rates 
around  these  ceilings.  In  particular,  when  market 
interest  rates  rise  above  Regulation  Q  ceilings,  the 
growth  rate  of  small  time  and  savings  deposits  falls 
sharply  as  many  investors  withdraw  funds  out  of 
the  deposit  institutions  to  invest  in  market  instru- 
ments.  Such  behavior  is  widely  referred  to  as  “dis- 
intermediation.” 
A  Brief  History  of  Regulation  Q  Because  of  the 
importance  of  Regulation  Q  as  a  determinant  of  the 
volume  of  small  time  and  savings  deposits,  a  short 
review  of the  history  of  this  regulation  may  be  useful. 
Deposit  interest  rate  ceilings  under  Regulation  Q 
originated  with  the  Banking  Act  of  1933  and  initially 
applied  only  to  rates  paid  on  commercial  bank  time 
and  savings  deposits.  The  purpose  of  the  ceilings 
was  to  prevent  “excessive”  rate  competition  for  de- 
posits  that  might  encourage  risky  loan  and  invest- 
ment  policies  and  lead  to  bank  failures. 
Until  the  1960’s  Regulation  Q  was  of  little  sig- 
nificance  in  U.  S.  banking.  There  were  two  main 
reasons  for  this.  First,  between  1933  and  1960  com- 
mercial  banks  showed  little  or  no  interest  in  com- 
peting  for  time  and  savings  deposits,  leaving  the 
so-called  “thrift  deposit”  market  to  other  types  of 
institutions.  In  the  second  place,  market  interest 
rates  through  most  of  this  period  were  below  the 
legal  ceilings  and  market  instruments  posed  no  seri- 
ous  threat  to  the  ability  of  banks  or  other  institutions 
to  attract  thrift  deposits.  Only  in  1957,  after  a 
gradual  but  steady  updrift  in  market  rates,  did  mar- 
ket  instruments  begin  to  compete  with  thrift  institu- 
tion  deposits.  In  that  year,  the  legal  ceiling  was 
raised  from  2½  percent  to  3  percent.  The  only 
previous  adjustment  in  the  ceiling  was  a  reduction 
from  3  percent  to  2½  percent  in  1935. 
For  reasons  associated  mainly  with  a  continuing 
updrift  in  interest  rates  and  its  impact  on  the  ability 
of  commercial  banks  to  raise  funds,  this  situation 
changed  dramatically  in  the  1960’s.  Early  in  that 
decade  commercial  banks  began  to  compete,  with 
increasing  aggressiveness,  for  both  thrift  deposits  and 
money  market  funds.  Through  1961  and  1962,  when 
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they  were  able  to  do  so  effectively.  But  as  the  busi- 
ness  recovery  progressed  and  market  interest  rates 
rose,  the  Regulation  Q  ceiling,  at  a  maximum  of  3 
percent,  hampered  banks  in  their  efforts  to  raise 
funds.  At  the  same  time,  the  philosophy  of  bank 
regulation,  which  between  1933  and  the  late  1950’s 
focused  on  limiting  competition,  was  evolving  in  a 
direction  that  placed  emphasis  on  increasing  com- 
petition,  not  only  among  commercial  banks  but  also 
between  the  various  types  of  depository  institutions. 
In  this  new  environment,  the  maximum  Regulation 
Q  ceiling  was  raised  to  4  percent.  and  then  to  4½ 
percent  in  1964  and  5½  percent  in  late  1965. 
The  rising  interest  rates  in  the  early  and  middle 
1960’s  affected  banks  and  thrift  institutions  differ- 
ently,  mainly  because  of  differences  in  the  asset  com- 
position  of  the  two  types  of  institutions.  For  thrift 
institutions  a  large  imbalance  existed  between  the 
long-term  maturity  of  their  assets  (primarily  mort- 
gages)  and  the  short-term  maturity  of  their  liabili- 
ties.  As  a  result,  it  was  difficult  for  them  to  compete 
for  deposits  at  current  market  levels  without  experi- 
encing  poor  or  negative  cash  flows.  In  order  to  dis- 
courage  rate  competition  for  deposits  among  savings 
and  loan  associations  in  these  circumstances,  the 
Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board  (FHLBB)  in  1964 
and  1965  refused  to  make  advances  to  institutions 
that  paid  above  a  specified  yield  on  deposits.  Due 
to  the  value  of  FHLBB  advances  to  savings  and  loan 
associations  in  this  period,  this  action  by  the  FHLBB 
constituted  de  facto  rate  control.1 
The  average  maturity  of  commercial  bank  assets  is 
much  shorter  than  that  of  the  thrift  institutions. 
Consequently,  banks  were  better  able  to  compete  for 
deposits  on  a  rate  basis  when  market  interest  rates 
rose  in  1965  and  1966.  As  the  rate  paid  on  deposits 
at  banks  rose  relative  to  that  paid  at  the  thrift  institu- 
tions,  the  growth  rate  of  deposits  at  the  thrift  insti- 
tutions  in  1965  and  much  of  1966  fell  relative  to  the 
growth  rate  at  commercial  banks.2  This  experience 
provoked  strong  protest  from  the  thrift  institutions. 
There  was  also  a  widespread  belief  at  the  time  that 
1 The  actions  taken  by  the  FHLBB  to  control  dividend 
rates  are  described  in  [9]. 
2 In  1963  and  1964  the  growth  rates  of  time  and  savings 
deposits  at  the  thrift  institutions  were  12.0  percent  and 
11.1  percent  respectively,  while  the  growth  rates  at  banks 
were  a  comparable  11.8  percent  and  10.0  percent.  In 
1965,  however,  the  growth  rate  of  deposits  at  the  thrift 
institutions  was  8.3  percent  while  the  growth  rate  of 
deposits  at  banks  was  a  much  greater  14.7  percent.  Simi- 
larly,  in  the  first  three  quarters  of  1966  the  annualized 
growth  rate  of  deposits  at  the  thrift  institutions  was  3.8 
percent,  while  the  growth  rate  at  banks  was  10.7  percent. 
the  decline  in  the  relative  growth  rate  of  thrift  versus 
bank  deposits  was  having  an  adverse  effect  on  mort- 
gage  markets  and  the  housing  industry.  Congress 
reacted  to  these  concerns  in  September  of  1966  by 
passing  the  Interest  Adjustment  Act. 
The  Interest  Adjustment  Act  expanded  the  cover- 
age  of  deposit  interest  rate  ceilings  to  the  thrift  insti- 
tutions.  The  purpose  of  this  expanded  coverage  was 
to  prevent  “excessive”  competition  between  banks 
and  the  thrift  institutions.  By  setting  rate  ceilings  on 
both  banks  and  the  thrift  institutions,  it  was  reasoned, 
loss  of  funds  from  the  latter  to  the  former  could  be 
prevented  in  periods  of  rising  interest  rates.  This, 
however,  would  not  prevent  withdrawal  of  savings 
and  time  deposits  from  both  institutions  for  invest- 
ment  in  market  instruments  that  carried  yields  above 
the  Regulation  Q  ceilings. 
A  second  feature  of  the  Interest  Adjustment  Act 
was  the  establishment  of  a  “differential”  between  the 
ceiling  rates  that  banks  and  thrifts  could  pay  on 
deposits,  which  allowed  the  thrifts  to  pay  a  higher 
rate.  The  rationale  underlying  the  differential  was 
that  banks  had  an  inherent  competitive  advantage 
over  thrifts  because  of  the  wider  array  of  services 
they  could  offer  customers.  In  order  to  offset  this 
competitive  advantage,  it  was  argued,  thrifts  needed 
to  be  able  to  pay  higher  deposit  rates.  The  ceiling 
rates  on  savings  deposits  were  initially  set  at  4.00 
percent  for  banks  and  4.75  percent  for  the  thrift 
institutions,  a  differential  of  75  basis  points.  The 
ceiling  rate  for  time  deposits  at  banks  was  rolled 
back  from  5½  to  5  percent  while  the  ceiling  rate 
for  the  thrift  institutions  was  set  at  5¼  percent,  a 
differential  of  25  basis  points.  These  rates  were 
below  comparable  maturity  market  interest  rates  at 
the  time. 
Since  the  passage  of  the  Interest  Adjustment  Act, 
there  have  been  major  revisions  of  Regulation  Q 
ceiling  rates  on  savings  and  small  time  deposits  in 
1970,  1973,  and  1978.3  Each  revision  was  a  reaction 
to  declining  deposit  growth  resulting  from  rising 
market  interest  rates.  The  first  revision  occurred  in 
January  1970  following  the  sharp  rise  in  market 
interest  rates  in  1969.  The  1970  revision  established 
three  separate  maturity  categories  of  small  time  de- 
3 It  should  be  emphasized  that  this  discussion  applies 
only  to  small  time  deposits  less  than  $100,000.  The  Regu- 
lation  Q  ceilings  on  large  time  deposits  greater  than 
$100,000  were  removed  in  June  1970  for  maturities  from 
30  to  90  days  and  removed  in  May  1973  for  longer  ma- 
turities.  Also,  this  discussion  ignores  some  minor 
changes  Revisions  of  Regulation  Q  ceiling  rates  are  sum- 
marized  in  the  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board  Journal 
and  the  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin. 
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for  time  deposits  of  maturity  up  to  a  year,  5½  per- 
cent  for  l-  to  2-year  maturities,  and  5¾  percent 
for  maturities  of  2  years  and  over.  The  goal  of 
this  graduated  rate  structure  was  to  lengthen  the 
average  maturity  of  deposits-  at  banks  and  the  thrift 
institutions,  in  order  to  reduce  the  potential  for  large 
scale  withdrawals  in  periods  of  rising  interest  rates. 
The  ceiling  rate  for  bank  savings  deposits  was 
raised  to  4½  percent.  The  ceiling  for  thrifts  was  set 
at  5  percent,  thereby  reducing  the  savings  deposit 
differential  to  50  basis  points.  The  differential  in  all 
time  deposit  categories  was  maintained  at  25  basis 
points. 
When  interest  rates  rose  sharply  and  deposit 
growth  rates  plummeted  in  1973,  Regulation  Q  was 
again  revised.  Although  the  design  of  the  July  1973 
revision  followed  the  lines  of  the  1970  revision,  the 
changes  were  more  substantial.  The  1973  revision 
raised  the  commercial  bank  interest  ceiling  on  pass- 
book  savings  from  4½  percent  to  5  percent  and 
raised  the  ceiling  rate  on  time  deposits  with  maturi- 
ties  of  90  days  to  1 year  from  5 to  5½  percent.  The 
l-  to  2-year  category  was  changed  to  1 to  2½  years 
and  its  ceiling  rate  was  raised  from  5½  to  6  percent. 
In  addition,  two  new  categories  were  established  to 
replace  the  “greater-than-two”  year  category.  These 
new  categories  were  2½  to  4  years  and  4  years  or 
more.  The  2½-  to  4-year  category  was  allowed  a 6½ 
percent  ceiling  rate  while  the  4-year  category  initially 
carried  no  ceiling  at  all.  Deposits  in  the  latter  cate- 
gory  were  widely  dubbed  “wildcard”  deposits. 
Because  the  wildcard  deposits  had  no  ceiling  rate, 
banks  and  the  thrift  institutions  could  compete  for 
them  freely.  This  fact,  in  conjunction  with  the  de- 
clining  growth  rate  of  deposits  at  the  thrift  institu- 
tions  during  this  period,  fostered  the  belief  that  the 
wildcard  deposits  were  responsible  for  a  massive 
shift  in  deposits  from  the  thrift  institutions  to  the 
banks.4  As  a  result,  in  November  of  1973  ceiling 
rates  of  7¼  percent  at  banks  and  7½  percent  at  the 
thrift  institutions  were  placed  on  these  deposits. 
The  differential  on  all  time  deposit  categories  was 
left  at  25  basis  points  in  the  1973  revision  of  Regu- 
lation  Q,  with  the  exception  of  the  l-  to  2½-year 
category,  whose  differential  was  set  at  50  basis 
points.  The  savings  deposit  rate  ceiling  at  the  thrift 
institutions  was  raised  only  to  5.25  percent,  thereby 
4 In  retrospect,  there  appears  to  be  little  evidence  that 
the  wildcard  deposits  resulted  in  a  significant  shift  of 
small  time  deposits  from  the  thrifts  to  banks.  See 
Kane  [6]. 
further  reducing  the  savings  deposit  rate  differential 
from  50  to  25  basis  points. 
In  December  1974  yet  another  maturity  category 
was  established,  for  deposits  with  a  maturity  of  6 
years  or  more.  The  ceiling  rate  for  such  deposits 
was  set  at  7½  percent  at  banks  and  7¾  percent  at 
the  thrift  institutions.  A  final  revision,  in  1978,  will 
be  discussed  later  in  this  article. 
This  brief  history  of  Regulation  Q  raises  a number 
of  questions.  For  example,  how  do  Regulation  Q 
ceiling  rates  affect  the  growth  of  small  time  and 
savings  deposits  at  banks  and  the  thrift  institutions? 
How  successful  was  the  substantial  1973  revision  of 
Regulation  Q  in  diminishing  the  threat  of  disinter- 
mediation?  How  has  the  rate  differential  affected 
the  relative  growth  of  deposits  at  banks  and  the  thrift 
institutions? 
Table  la 
PERCENTAGE  OF  BANKS  PAYING 
CEILING  RATES  ON  NEW  DEPOSITS 
180  Days 
to  1 to  2½  2½  to  4  4  to  6  6  Years 
Savings  1  Year  Years  Years  Years  or  More 
July  31,  1973  63.9  47.3  80.3  86.3 
October  31,  1973  76.1  81.2  92.3  95.4 
January  31,  1974  79.0  87.1  95.8  96.4  56.6 
April  30,  1974  80.8  89.5  96.6  97.6  62.1 
July  31,  1974  82.7  89.5  97.1  97.7  69.8 
October  31,  1974  83.7  90.5  97.4  97.9  74.5 
January  31,  1975  84.9  93.0  97.8  98.0  78.5  96.8 
April  30,  1975  85.5  91.4  94.9  97.5  79.7  93.6 
July  31,  1975  86.4  92.7  96.5  98.1  81.7  95.1 
October  31,  1975  87.8  93.2  96.5  97.7  82.7  93.9 
January  31,  1976  88.5  91.7  97.2  98.7  83.5  95.9 
April  30,  1976  89.1  92.3  97.4  98.3  83.2  94.8 
July  28,  1976  86.6  92.6  96.1  97.6  85.4  91.5 
October  27,  1976  84.7  91.6  96.3  97.1  84.3  95.2 
January  26,  1977  83.9  89.2  94.5  97.1  80.0  91.7 
April  27,  1977  84.4  87.0  91.9  92.6  77.6  87.4 
July  27,  1977  84.6  91.2  95.6  94.7  79.3  93.9 
October  26,  1977  86.1  92.2  95.4  97.2  81.9  91.8 
January  25,  1978  86.0  91.1  96.9  97.5  86.1  93.3 
April  26,  1978  86.3  91.8  96.9  95.7  85.9  93.8 
Notes:  (1)  Prior  to  the  April  1975  survey  the  data  are  for  “percent 
paying  highest  50  basis  point  bracket”  rather  than 
“percent  paying  ceiling  rates.”  However,  the  difference 
between  the  two  series  is  generally  less  than  2  percentage 
points. 
(2)  In  the  July  1976  survey  the  sampling  technique  was 
changed.  These  changes  ore  described  in  the  December 
1976  issue  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin. 
(3)  Prior  to  the  July  1976  survey  all  data  are  for  “individuals, 
partnerships  and  corporations  (IPC).”  Subsequently,  the 
savings  category  shown  is  for  “individuals  and  nonprofit 
organizations”  while  all  other  categories  are  for  “other 
than  domestic  government  units.” 
source:  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin. 
16  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  NOVEMBER/DECEMBER  1978 Some  Survey  Results  Since  the  1973  revision  of 
Regulation  Q,  the  FHLBB  has  conducted  semi- 
annual  surveys  on  the  amounts  outstanding  of and  the 
rates  paid  on  the  various  categories  of  savings  and 
small  time  deposits  at  savings  and  loan  associations. 
Similar  surveys,  on  a  quarterly  basis,  of  commercial 
banks  have  been  conducted  by  the  Federal  Reserve 
since  1967.  The  information  provided  in  these  sur- 
veys  is  useful  in  answering  the  questions  posed  above. 
The  survey  data,  collected  from  various  issues  of  the 
Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board  Journal  and  the 
Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  is  presented  below. 
The  Rates  Paid  The  first  set  of  survey  informa- 
tion  is  the  rates  paid  on  the  various  categories  of 
small  time  and  savings  deposits.  The  percent  of 
banks  paying  the  Regulation  Q  maximum  rate  is 
shown  in  Table  Ia  and  the  percent  of  savings  and 
loan  associations  is  shown  in  Table  Ib.5  Table  Ia 
shows  that  most  banks  have  paid  the  ceiling  rates  on 
all  categories  of  small  time  and  savings  deposits  since 
the  new  ceilings  were  instituted  in  1973.  For  some 
banks,  however,  there  was  a  lag  before  the  high 
market  rates  of  1974  induced  them  to  move  to  the 
new  ceiling  rates.  In  1976  and  1977  some  banks 
moved  away  from  the  ceiling  rates  in  reaction  to 
lower  market  interest  rates,  but  most  remained  at 
the  ceilings.  When  market  interest  rates  moved 
higher  in  the  second  half  of  1977  and  the  beginning 
of  1978,  those  banks  that  had  lowered  their  rates 
returned  to  the  ceiling  rates. 
The  rate-setting  behavior  of  savings  and  loan 
associations,  shown  in  Table  Ib,  has  been  similar  to 
that  of  banks.  Most  savings  and  loan  associations 
have  paid  the  ceiling  rates  in  all  maturity  categories, 
except  the  90-day  to  l-year  category.  On  average 
only  40  percent  have  paid  the  maximum  rate  on  that 
category.  As  in  the  case  of  banks,  some  savings  and 
loan  associations  moved  away  from  the  ceiling  rates 
on  longer  term  maturities  when  market  interest  rates 
declined  in  1976  and  1977,  and  then  returned  to  the 
ceiling  rates  when  market  rates  subsequently  rose. 
Because  the  majority  of  both  thrifts  and  banks 
paid  the  maximum  rates  on  the  various  categories  of 
small  time  and  savings  deposits  throughout  the  1973- 
1978  period,  these  rates  can  be  used  as  a  measure  of 
the  yields  available  on  such  deposits  during  that 
period.  Chart  1  shows  the  differentials  between  the 
ceiling  rates  on  small  time  deposits  at  banks  and 
5 Survey  data  are  also  collected  on  percent  of  deposits 
paying  the  maximum  rate.  The  comments  in  this  section 
would  also  apply  ii  the  data  were  shown  on  that  basis 
rather  than  on  the  basis  of  percent  of  banks. 
Table  lb 
PERCENTAGE  OF 
SAVINGS  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS  PAYING 
CEILING  RATES  ON  MEW  DEPOSITS 
90 Days 
to  1 to 2½  2½ to 4  4 to 6  6 Years 
Savings 1 Year  Years  Years  Years  or More 
September  30,  1973  86.9 
Match  31,  1974  90.7 
September  30,  1974  92.5 
March  31,  1975  93.7 
September  30,  1975  94.0 
March  31,  1976  94.7 
September  30,  1976  95.3 
March  31,  1977  94.9 
September  30,  1977  95.7 
March  31,  1978  96.8 
37.8  72.3  80.2  66.2 
38.5  77.3  82.0  90.8 
39.7  81.2  84.0  88.4  58.8 
40.8  82.6  85.0  91.1  60.9 
41.1  83.8  85.2  87.7  59.2 
41.2  84.8  85.4  85.7  56.1 
37.4  80.3  81.2  72.3 44.7 
40.0  84.7  84.3  84.7  55.1 
43.3  88.3  87.2  93.6  77.7 
Source:  Federal  Home  Loon  Bank  Board  Journal. 
rates  on  Treasury  securities  of  comparable  maturity. 
The  chart  illustrates  that  the  attractiveness  of  a  par- 
ticular  maturity  category  can  change  greatly  over 
time.  In  addition,  the  relative  attractiveness  of  the 
various  categories  of  small  time  and  savings  deposits 
varies  substantially  as  the  yield  curve  on  market 
instruments  changes.  Finally,  the  chart  shows  that 
the  yield  on  the  4-year  or  over  category  has  been 
the  most  attractive  relative  to  market  rates  ever  since 
it  was  created  in  1973. 
Movement  in  the  Deposit  Categories  Tables  IIa 
and IIb summarize  the  information  from  the  surveys 
on  the  amounts  of  the  various  categories  of  small 
time  and  savings  deposits  outstanding  at  banks  and 
savings  and  loan  associations.  Table IIa  shows  the 
amounts  outstanding  and  percentage  of  the  total  for 
five  categories  of  bank  deposits,  namely  savings  de- 
posits  and  time  deposits  with  original  maturities  of 
30  days  to  1 year, 1  to  2½  years,  2½  to  4  years,  and 
4  years  or  more. 
Charts  2  and  3  use  the  bank  survey  data  from 
Table  IIa  to  plot  the  quarterly  movements  of  (1) 
savings  deposits  plus  time  deposits  of  less  than  1- 
year  maturity  and  (2)  time  deposits  of  maturity  of 
4  years  or  more.  (Together  these  constituted  86 
percent  of  total  bank  small  time  and  savings  deposits 
in  the  April  1978  survey.)  The  movement  of  the 
differentials  between  Regulation  Q  ceiling  rates  and 
market  interest  rates  shown  in  Chart  1  is  helpful  in 
understanding  the  behavior  of  these  deposits. 
Chart  2  compares  the  spread  between  the  bank 
ceiling  rate  on  90-day  to  l-year  deposits  and  the 
6-month  Treasury  bill  rate  to  the  movement  in 
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The  chart  shows  that  quarterly  movements  in 
these  deposits  have  varied  over  a  wide  range  of  -$l 
billion  to  +$14  billion  primarily  in  response  to 
wide  swings  in  short-term  market  interest  rates 
around  the  Regulation  Q  ceiling  rate.  A  noteworthy 
aspect  of  the  behavior  of  the  short-term  deposits 
shown  in  Chart  2  is  the  sharp  drop  in  the  growth 
that  accompanied  a  relatively  small  negative  spread 
in  late  1977.  This  sharp  drop  can  be  attributed  to 
the  run-off  of  highly  interest  sensitive  short-term 
funds  that  had  accumulated  over  the  previous  year- 
and-a-half  when  short-term  yields  on  money  market 
instruments  fell  below  Regulation  Q  ceilings. 
As  shown  in  Chart  3,  time  deposits  of  maturity  of 
4  years  or  more  have  also  varied  with  the  attrac- 
tiveness  of  that  category’s  yield  spread,  although  the 
variation  has  been  much  narrower  than  for  short- 
term  deposits.  The  sharp  decline  in  inflows  of  the 
4-year  maturity  during  the  July-October  1977 
period  can  be  attributed  to  the  run-off  of the  wildcard 
deposits  issued  four  years  earlier.  A  large  amount 
of  these  wildcard  certificates  at  banks  were  shifted 
to  the  thrift  institutions  in  response  to  the  25  basis 
point  differential  available  at  those  institutions.6 
The  survey  data  in  Table  IIa  is  also  useful  in 
tracking  trends  in  the  overall  composition  of  small 
time  and  savings  deposits.  The  table  shows  that  the 
percentage  of  total  small  time  and  savings  deposits 
with  an  original  maturity  of  4  years  or  more  rose 
from  1.4  percent  in  July  1973  to  19.1  percent  in 
April  1978.  The  proportion  in  2½-  to  4-year  de- 
posits  changed  little  over  the  1973-78  period  while 
the  proportions  in  1  to  2½  years  and  30  days  to  1 
year  declined.  The  proportion  of  the  total  in  savings 
6 About  $27  billion  of  the  wildcard  deposits  were  sold  in 
1973.  Of  these,  about  one-third  were  issued  by  banks. 
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ORIGINAL  MATURITY  OF  SMALL  TIME  AND  SAVINGS  DEPOSITS  AT  COMMERCIAL  BANKS 
July  31,  1973  124,086  54.4  42,963  18.8  48,170  21.1  9,841  4.3  3,203  1.4  228,263 
October  31,  1973  124,217  54.1  38,944  16.9  45,543  19.8  11,576  5.0  9,506  4.1  229,786 
January  31,  1974  126,175  53.4  38,638  16.4  45,037  19.1  13,262  5.6  12,954  5.5  236,066 
April  30,  1974  129,928  53.6  37,592  15.5  42,670  17.6  14,391  5.9  17,592  7.3  242,173 
July  31,  1974  131,701  53.6  36,107  14.7  41,006  16.7  15,326  6.2  21,364  8.7  245,504 
October  31,  1974  132,449  53.7  34,621  14.0  38,744  15.7  15,865  6.4  24,895  10.1  246,574 
January  31,  1975  135,856  53.5  34,628  13.6  37,240  14.7  17,365  6.8  28,752  11.3  253,841 
April  30,  1975  144,250  53.9  36,329  13.6  36,203  13.5  18,568  7.0  32,450  12.1  267,800 
July  31,  1975  151,965  54.1  37,443  13.3  35,872  12.8  19,500  6.9  35,956  12.8  280,736 
October  31,  1975  154,282  54.0  37,262  13.0  35,397  12.4  20,318  7.1  38,603  13.5  285,862 
January  31,  1976  165,470  54.7  38,424  12.7  36,006  11.9  20,453  6.8  42,070  13.9  302,423 
April  30,  1976  178,190  55.7  40,019  12.5  36,093  11.3  19,357  6.0  46,399  14.5  320,058 
July  28,  1976  180.698  56.2  39,773  12.3  33,008  10.3  18,690  5.8  49,281  15.3  321,450 
October  27,  1976  187,506  55.8  41,761  12.4  34,002  10.1  18,402  5.5  54,098  16.1  335,769 
January  26,  1977  199,028  56.5  42,620  12.1  33,979  9.6  17,646  5.0  59,090  16.8  352,363 
April  27,  1977  206,416  56.5  43,062  11.8  34,077  9.3  18,119  5.0  63,556  17.4  365,230 
July  27,  1977  210,081  56.4  43,895  11.8  34,207  9.2  18,768  5.0  65,804  17.7  372,755 
October  26,  1977  211,928  56.9  41,492  11.1  34,601  9.3  18,539  5.0  66,132  17.7  372,691 
January  25,  1978  213,184  56.7  41,296  11.0  33,977  9.0  18,463  4.9  68,864  18.3  375,782 
April  26,  1978  216,622  56.6  39,743  10.4  34,075  8.9  19,181  5.0  72,948  19.1  382,569 
Savings  Less  Than  1  Year  1  to  2½  Years  2½  to  4  Years  4  Years  or  Over 
Amount 
%  of 
Total  Amount 
%  of 
Total 
($  millions) 
Amount 
%  of 
Total  Amount 
%  of 
Total  Amount 
%  of 
Total  Total 
Notes:  (1)  Data  exclude  domestic  government  units. 
(2)  In  the  July  1976  survey  the  sampling  technique  was  changed.  This  created  a  discontinuity  in  the  quantity  data.  The 
effect  on  the  “percent  of  total”  calculations,  however,  appears  negligible. 
Source:  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin. 
Table  Ilb 
ORIGINAL  MATURITY  OF  SMALL  TIME  AND  SAVINGS  DEPOSITS  AT  SAVINGS  AND  LOAN  ASSOClATlONS 
($  millions) 
September  30,  1973  103,451  49.3  95,996  45.8  2,740  1.3  7,504  3.6  209,691 
March  31,  1974  104,600  47.4  82,724  37.5  6,680  3.0  26,782  12.1  220,786 
September  30,  1974  102,763  46.0  65,679  29.4  9,351  4.2  45,702  20.4  223,495 
March  31,  1975  109,399  45.7  52,306  21.9  11,671  4.9  65,789  27.5  239,165 
September  30,  1975  116,819  45.1  47,921  18.5  13,774  5.3  80,678  31.1  259,192 
March  31,  1976  124,557  44.0  48,956  17.3  14,046  5.0  95,501  33.7  283,060 
September  30,  1976  129,885  42.9  49,778  16.4  13,485  4.5  109,824  36.2  302,972 
March  31,  1977  136,813  47.5  52,748  16.0  14,061  4.3  126,145  38.3  329,767 
September  30,  1977  142,457  40.3  54,494  15.4  14,562  4.1  141,549  40.1  353,062 
March  31,  1978  146,252  39.3  53,996  14.5  14,942  4.0  157,085  42.2  372,275 
Savings 
Amount  %  of  Total 
-- 
90  Days  to 
2½  Years 
Amount  %  of  Total 
-- 
2½  to  4  Years 
Amount  %  of  Total 
-- 
4  Years  or  Over 
Amount  %  of  Total 
-- 
Total 
Note:  The  FHLBB  collects  the  deposit  data  on  the  basis  of  rote  paid  rather  than  term-to-maturity.  The  assumptions  used  to  construct 
this  table  are  that  certificates  with a  rate  equal  to  or  less  than a  6.50  percent  rate  ore  in  the  90-day  to  2½-year  category;  certificates 
with  a  rate  from  6.51  to  6.75  are  in  the  2½-  to  4-year  category;  and  certificates  with  a  rate  greater  than  6.75  are  in  the  4-year  or 
over  category.  Because  of  the  way  in  which  the  data  are  collected,  no  attempt  was  mode  to  separate  the  90-day  to  1-year  and  1-  to 
2½-year  categories. 
Source:  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board  Journal. 
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early  1978. 
Table  IIb  shows  roughly  the  same  breakdown  for 
small  time  and  savings  deposits  at  savings  and  loan 
associations.  Time  deposits  with  an  original  ma- 
turity  of  90  days  to  1  year  and  1  to  2½  years 
are  combined  in  one  category  because  of  the  way  the 
data  are  collected  by  the  FHLBB.7  The  table  shows 
that  the  trends  in  the  composition  of  small  time  and 
savings  deposits  have  been  similar  to  those  at  banks, 
although  there  are  some  significant  differences,  The 
savings  component  of  total  savings  and  loan  associ- 
ation  deposits  fell  from  49.3  percent  in  the  September 
1973  survey  to  39.3  percent  in  the  March  1978  sur- 
vey.  Another  difference  is  that  time  deposits  with  an 
original  maturity  of  4  years  or  more  had  risen  to 
42  percent  of  total  small  time  and  savings  deposits 
by  March  1978. 
Table  IIb  also  demonstrates  that  the  pattern  of 
movement  of  the  categories  at  S&L’s  as  market 
interest  rates  have  changed  has  been  similar  to  the 
pattern  at  banks. 
The  Maturity  Profiles  The  survey  data  in  Tables 
IIa  and  IIb  are  on  the  basis  of  original  maturity. 
The  FHLBB  also  collects  data  on  current  time-to- 
maturity  of  outstanding  deposits  at  savings  and  loan 
associations.  These  data,  summarized  in  Table  III,, 
provide  the  best  information  on  the  impact  of  the 
1973  Regulation  Q  revision  on  the  maturity  of  out- 
standing  deposits.  Table  III  shows  that  in  the  first 
half  of the  five-year  period  there  was  a  steady  decline 
in  the  proportion  of  deposits  highly  vulnerable  to 
disintermediation,  i.e.,  savings  deposits  plus  time  de- 
posits  maturing  in  less  than  1  year.  When  short- 
term  rates  fell  below  Regulation  Q  ceiling  rates  in 
1976  and  1977,  however,  the  resulting  huge  inflow  of 
short-term  deposits  had  the  effect  of  actually  raising 
the  overall  proportion  of  deposits  especially  vulner-  7 See  note,  Table  IIb. 
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Table  III.  The  ratio  of  savings  and  small  time  de- 
posits  maturing  in  less  than  a year  to  total  small  time 
and  savings  deposits  dropped  steadily  from  74.7  per- 
cent  in  the  March  1973  survey  to  63.2  percent  in  the 
September  1975  survey.  Subsequently,  however,  the 
ratio  rose  to  66.7  percent  in  the  September  1977 
survey.  The  March  1978  survey  shows  a  drop  back 
to  63.6  percent  in  this  ratio  following  the  withdrawal 
of  interest  sensitive  short-term  deposits  from  S&L’s 
in  reaction  to  rising  market  interest  rates. 
The  Federal  Reserve  surveys  do  not  collect  data 
on  the  current  maturity  of  outstanding  deposits. 
However,  it  was  shown  earlier  that  the  proportion  of 
total  bank  small  time  and  savings  deposits  with  an 
original  maturity  of  at  least  4  years  had  risen  only 
to  19.1  percent  by  April  1978.  Furthermore,  it 
was  shown  that  the  proportion  in  savings  deposits 
actually  rose  slightly  over  the  period  covered  in 
Table  IIa.  Consequently,  it  can  safely  be  concluded 
that  the  bank  ratio  of  savings  plus  small  time  and 
savings  deposits  maturing  in  less  than  a  year  to  total 
small  time  and  savings  deposits  declined  significantly 
less  over  this  period  than  did  the  S&L  ratio. 
The  Impact  of  the  Ceiling  Rate  Differential  The 
survey  data  are  also  useful  in  assessing  the  impact  of 
the  differential  between  the  ceiling  rates  at  thrifts 
versus  banks.  From  the  September/October  1973 
surveys  to  the  March/April  1978  surveys,  savings 
deposits  at  banks  rose  $92.4  billion,  while  savings 
deposits  at  S&L’s  only  rose  $42.8  billion,  despite  the 
25  basis  point  differential  favoring  S&L’s.  As  a 
result,  the  proportion  of  savings  deposits  at  banks  to 
total  savings  deposits  at  banks  and  S&L’s  rose  from 
54.6  to  59.7  percent.  Over  the  same  period,  however, 
small  time  deposits  of  original  maturity  of  4  years 
or  more  rose  $63.4  billion  at  banks  and  $149.6  billion 
at  S&L’s.  Consequently,  the  percentage  of  small 
time  deposits  of  4  years  or  more  at  banks  to  the 
total  of  those  deposits  at  banks  and  S&L’s  combined 
was  only  31.7  percent  at  the  end  of  the  period.  While 
small  time  deposits  of  original  maturity  of  less  than 
4  years  declined  at  both  banks  and  S&L’s  over  the 
period,  the  proportion  of  the  total  at  banks  rose  from 
49.3  to  57.4  percent. 
As  noted,  the  rationale  for  the  differential  favoring 
S&L’s  is  that  it  is  necessary  to  offset  the  inherent 
competitive  advantage  that  banks  have  in  offering  a 
wide  variety  of  financial  services.  On  the  one  hand, 
the  survey  data  appear  to  support  this  rationale  with 
respect  to  regular  savings  accounts,  which  typically 
involve  several  transactions  over  time.  In  fact,  the 
survey  data  indicate  that  the  25  basis  point  differ- 
Table  III 
MATURITY  OF  OUTSTANDING  SMALL  TIME 
AND  SAVINGS  DEPOSITS  AT 




Maturing  Maturing  Maturing  Maturing 
Within  in  1  to  After  Within 
Savings  1 Year  2  Years  2  Years  1  Year 
March  31,  1973  50.4 
September  30,  1973  48.8 
March  31,  1974  46.5 
September  30,  1974  46.0 
March  31,  1975  45.7 
September  30,  1975  45.1 
March  31,  1976  44.0 
September  30.  1976  42.9 
March  31,  1977  41.5 
September  30,  1977  40.3 
March  31,  1978  39.2 
24.5  21.4  3.7  74.7 
27.8  16.2  7.2  76.6 
27.8  9.8  15.8  74.3 
23.5  7.9  22.6  69.5 
18.7  6.8  28.8  64.4 
18.1  7.6  29.3  63.2 
17.5  13.3  25.2  61.5 
19.0  15.7  22.4  61.9 
24.3  13.6  20.6  65.8 
26.4  10.6  22.6  66.7 
24.4  7.9  28.5  63.6 
Source:  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board  Journal. 
ential  has  been  insufficient  to  offset  the  advantage 
banks  have  in  competing  for  savings  deposits.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  survey  data  clearly  do  not  support 
the  need  for  a  25  basis  point  differential  on  the  ceil- 
ing  rate  for  small  time  deposits  of  4  years  or  more, 
which  involve  only  one  transaction  at  the  beginning 
of  a  four-  or  six-year  period.  The  differential  has 
apparently  induced  most  savers  to  place  these  de- 
posits  at  the  thrift  institutions. 
The  survey  data  is  ambiguous  concerning  the  im- 
pact  of  the  differential  on  competition  for  small  time 
deposits  of  original  maturity  of  less  than  4  years. 
As  indicated,  the  banking  sector’s  share  of  these  de- 
posits  has  risen  over  the  survey  period.  A  large 
percentage  of  S&L’s,  however,  has  not  paid  the 
maximum  rate  on  small  time  deposits  of  less  than 
1  year.  (See  Table  Ib.)  Therefore,  the  increased 
bank  share  of  these  deposits  can  not  necessarily  be 
attributed  to  an  insufficient  ceiling  rate  differential. 
Summary  of  the  Survey  Data  Before  turning  to 
the  aggregate  data,  it  may  be  useful,  as  a preliminary, 
to  summarize  the  major  conclusions  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  and  FHLBB  surveys  : 
(1)  Most  banks  and  S&L’s  kept  their  rates  at 
the  Regulation  Q  ceiling  rates  throughout  the 
1973-78  period.  However,  the  proportions  of 
banks  and  S&L’s  paying  the  ceiling  rates  varied 
somewhat  in  response  to  movements  in  market 
interest  rates. 
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the  fastest  growing  category  of  small  time  and 
savings  deposits  at  both  banks  and  S&L’s  has,  on 
average,  been  deposits  of  4  years  or  more  in 
original  maturity. 
(3)  When  short-term  money  market  rates  fall 
to  or  below  Regulation  Q  ceiling  rates,  the  deposi- 
tory  institutions  experience  large  inflows  of  highly 
interest  sensitive  short-term  funds,  which  are  sub- 
sequently  withdrawn  when  market  rates  rise. 
Consequently,  movements  of  market  interest  rates 
above  and  below  the  Regulation  Q  ceilings  (espe- 
cially  ceilings  for  short-term  maturities)  have  con- 
tinued  to  cause  wide  swings  in  inflows  of  small 
time  and  savings  deposits. 
(4)  Since  the  1973  revision  of  Regulation  Q, 
there  has  been  a  moderate  decline  in  the  propor- 
tion  of  small  time  and  savings  deposits  at  S&L’s 
maturing  within  1  year.  While  survey  data  on 
current  maturity  are  not  collected  in  the  Federal 
Reserve  surveys,  it  appears  that  the  proportion  of 
small  time  and  savings  deposits  at  banks  maturing 
within  1  year  has  declined  significantly  less  than 
at  S&L’s. 
(5)  The  25  basis  point  differential  that  the 
thrift  institutions  can  pay  on  small  time  and  sav- 
ings  deposits  has  not  offset  the  advantage  of  banks 
in  the  competition  for  savings  deposits.  The  differ- 
ential  has,  however,  given  the  thrifts  a  competitive 
advantage  in  the  sale  of  long-term  certificates. 
The  Aggregate  Data  Chart  4  compares  the  quar- 
terly  growth  rates  of  total  small  time  and  savings 
deposits  at  both  banks  and  thrift  institutions  to  the 
spread  between  the  six-month  bill  rate  and  the  ceiling 
rate  on  90-day  to  l-year  deposits.8  The  “X’s”  show 
the  growth  rates  from  1968  II  through  1973  II,  while 
the  “O’s”  show  the  growth  rates  from  1973  III 
through  1978  II.  Over  the  period  shown  in  Chart  4, 
there  was  a  fairly  stable  linear  relationship  between 
the  growth  rate  of  small  time  and  savings  deposits 
and  the  yield  spread.  A  demand  equation  based  on 
this  relationship  is  estimated  in  the  Appendix  to  this 
8  The  aggregate  commercial  bank  small  time  and  savings 
deposit  series  used  in  this  section  was  calculated  by  sub- 
tracting  a  series  on  large  time  deposits  greater  than 
$100,000  constructed  by  the  Board  of  Governors  from 
total  time  and  savings  deposits.  The  aggregate  small 
time  and  savings  deposits  series  for  the  thrift  institutions 
includes  all  time  and  savings  deposits,  because  data  on 
large  time  deposits  at  S&L’s  are  not  available  prior  to 
1976.  As  of  the  end  of  1977,  however,  large  time  deposits 
constituted  only  2.4  percent  of  total  S&L  deposits.  Con- 
sequently,  the  bias  in  comparing  the  movement  in  the 




article.  A  major  exception  to  the  relationship  oc- 
curred  in  the  second  and  third  quarters  of  1975, 
when  the  tax  rebates  boosted  deposit  growth  rates  to 
higher  levels  than  would  have  been  expected  given 
the  behavior  of  market  interest  rates  at  the  time. 
These  quarters  are  indicated  on  the  chart. 
Chart  4  shows  that  yield  spreads  in  favor  of  de- 
posits  have  resulted  in  very  large  quarterly  growth 
rates.  Conversely,  large  yield  spreads  (as  high  as  3 
percentage  points)  in  favor  of  money  market  instru- 
ments  have  resulted  in  a  negative  growth  rate  of 
small  time  and  savings  deposits  only  once  during  the 
period.  To  appreciate  this  aspect  of  the  behavior  of 
the  growth  rate  of  total  small  time  and  savings  de- 
posits,  it  is  useful  conceptually  to  divide  depositors 
into  two  groups,  those  who  are  sensitive  to  interest 
rate  movements  and  those  who  are  not.  There  is 
evidence  that  the  two  groups  correspond  roughly  to 
large  savers  and  small  savers.”  Investors  in  the 
9  Evidence  supporting  this  view  is  provided  in  an  article 
by  Goldman  [4]  based  on  a  survey  of  the  behavior  of 
savings  balances  by  size  at  25  S&L’s  during  the  I974 
period  of  disintermediation. 
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marily  because  they  have  had  limited  access  to  money 
market  instruments. 
When  yield  spreads  are  favorable  to  small  time 
and  savings  deposits,  there  is  a  large  inflow  of  funds, 
especially  short-term,  from  interest  rate  sensitive  in- 
vestors.  Hence,  relatively  modest  positive  spreads 
between  Regulation  Q  rates  and  Treasury  bill  rates 
have  generally  resulted  in  high  growth  rates  of  small 
time  and  savings  deposits.  On  the  other  hand,  when 
the  spreads  turn  negative,  interest  sensitive  funds 
return  to  the  market.  However,  investors  who  are 
not  interest  sensitive  continue  to  put  money  into 
deposits.  As  a  result,  the  growth  rate  of  small  time 
and  savings  deposits  has  almost  always  been  positive 
despite  the  behavior  of  the  interest  sensitive  group 
of  depositors. 
Impact  of  the  1973  Regulation  Q  Revision  Chart 
4  provides  no  indication  of  a  decrease  in  the  sensi- 
tivity  of  small  time  and  savings  deposits  to  move- 
ments  in  short-term  interest  rates  following  the  1973 
revision  of  Regulation  Q.  That  is,  the  relationship 
between  the  growth  rate  of  small  time  and  savings 
deposits  and  the  spread  between  the  bill  rate  and  the 
Regulation  Q  ceiling  rate  appears  very  similar  in  the 
1968  II  -  1973  II  and  1973  III  -  1978 II  periods. 
This  is  consistent  with  the  survey  data,  which  showed 
only  a small  decline  in  the  latter  period  in  the  propor- 
tion  of  small  time  and  savings  deposits  maturing 
within  one  year.  Furthermore,  the  regression  equa- 
tion  reported  in  the  Appendix  provides  additional 
support  for  this  observation.  Therefore,  it  is  reason- 
able  to  conclude  that  at  least  through  1978  II,  the 
1973  revision  of  Regulation  Q  did  not  reduce  the 
sensitivity  of  the  growth  rate  of  small  time  and  sav- 
ings  deposits  to  movements  in  short-term  market 
rates  relative  to  Regulation  Q  ceiling  rates. 
Disintermediation:  Banks  Versus  Thrift  Institu- 
tions  The  FHLBB  and  Federal  Reserve  survey 
data  reviewed  earlier  showed  that,  compared  to 
banks,  thrift  institutions  have  a  larger  proportion  of 
their  total  small  time  and  savings  deposits  in  long- 
term  certificates  and  a  smaller  proportion  in  savings 
deposits.  Accordingly,  the  percentage  of  small  time 
and  savings  deposits  especially  vulnerable  to  disinter- 
mediation  was  somewhat  lower  at  the  thrifts  than  at 
banks.  In  view  of  the  survey  data,  one  might  expect 
total  small  time  and  savings  deposits  to  hold  up 
better  at  the  thrifts  than  at  banks  in  periods  of  rising 
interest  rates.  Do  the  aggregate  data  support  this 
expectation? 
This  question  is  difficult  to  resolve  for  several 
reasons.  First,  there  were  several  other  events  in 
recent  years  affecting  the  relative  growth  rates  of 
small  time  and  savings  deposits  at  banks  and  thrift 
institutions.  Foremost  among  these  were  the  sale 
of  the  wildcard  deposits  in  1973,  two-thirds  of  which 
were  sold  by  the  thrift  institutions,  and  the  maturing 
of  these  wildcard  deposits  in  1977.  A  large  part  of 
the  maturing  wildcard  deposits  at  banks  were  shifted 
to  the  thrift  institutions  and,  perhaps,  to  other  invest- 
ments.  As  a  result,  the  growth  of  small  time  and 
savings  deposits  at  banks,  compared  to  thrifts,  de- 
clined  in  the  second  half  of  1977. 
The  second  problem  in  comparing  the  interest 
sensitivity  of  demand  for  small  time  and  savings 
deposits  at  the  two  sectors  is  that  over  the  earlier 
part  of  the  period  the  large  commercial  bank  time 
deposit  data,  used  to  construct  the  small  time  deposit 
series,  are  probably  not  of  very  high  quality.10  A 
third  relatively  minor  problem  is  that  while  large 
time  deposits  greater  than  $100,000  have  been  re- 
moved  from  the  bank  data,  a  small  amount  of  large 
time  deposits  remains  in  the  thrift  data. 
Chart  5  compares  the  growth  rates  of  small  time 
and  savings  deposits  at  commercial  banks  and  the 
thrift  institutions.  Clearly,  the  growth  rates  have 
moved  together  over  the  past  ten  years.  There  ap- 
pears,  however,  to  be  some  tendency  for  the  thrift 
growth  rate  to  fluctuate  less  in  response  to  changing 
interest  rates  in  the  latter  half  of  the  period.  From 
1973  through  1978  the  growth  rate  of  small  time  and 
savings  deposits  at  banks  varied  over  a  -0.9  to  24.2 
percent  range,  while  the  comparable  range  at  the 
thrift  institutions  was  only  3.7  to  17.4  percent. 
Therefore,  short  of  a  firm  conclusion,  the  aggregate 
data  appear  to  support  the  view  that  the  growth  rate 
of  small  time  and  savings  deposits  at  the  thrifts  has 
been  slightly  less  interest  sensitive  over  the  last  five 
years  than  the  growth  rate  at  commercial  banks.  In 
any  case,  the  similarity  in  the  behavior  of  the  two 
growth  rates  is  much  more  striking  than  the  differ- 
ence. 
The  1978  Revision  of  Regulation  Q  and  the 
Emergence  of  Money  Market  Funds  In  1977  and 
early  1978  market  interest  rates  rose  to  levels  equal- 
ing  or  surpassing  Regulation  Q  ceilings.  At  a  result, 
the  growth  rate  of  small  time  and  savings  deposits 
10  The  large  time  deposit  data  used  in  this  study  is  based 
on  actual  survey  data  beginning  in  1973.  From  1968 
through  1972,  however,  it  is  constructed  on  the  assump- 
tion  that  the  ratio  of  large  time  deposits  to  negotiable 
CD’s  at  weekly  reporting  banks  was  stable.  The  Board  of 
Governors  is  in  the  process  of  constructing  a  new  large 
time  deposit  series  using  some  survey  data  in  the  earlier 
period. 
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dictable:  Regulation  Q  ceilings  were  again  adjusted. 
Two  changes  were  made  as  of  the  beginning  of  June 
1978.  The  first  change  established  a  new  category  of 
time  deposits  having  a  maturity  of  8  years  or  longer. 
The  ceiling  rates  on  this  category  were  set  at  7¾ 
percent  for  banks  and  8  percent  for  the  thrift  insti- 
tutions. 
The  second  and  more  dramatic  change  in  Regula- 
tion  Q  was  the  introduction  of  6-month  “money 
market  certificates”  with  ceiling  rates  tied  to  the 
average  return  in  the  weekly  auction  of  6-month 
Treasury  bills.  Banks  are  allowed  to  offer  the  aver- 
age  auction  rate  on  these  certificates.  The  thrifts  are 
allowed  to  pay ¼  of  a  percentage  point  higher,  the 
usual  differential.11  The  minimum  denomination  for 
the  new  certificates  is  $10,000,  the  same  as  the  mini- 
mum  denomination  of  bills  at  the  weekly  Treasury 
auctions. 
In  the  past,  Treasury  securities  have  been  the 
major  investment  alternative  for  those  depositors 
whose  demand  for  small  time  and  savings  deposits 
has  been  sensitive  to  the  movement  in  market  interest 
rates.  By  providing  this  group  of  savers  with  the 
alternative  of  receiving  a  yield  competitive  with  the 
Treasury  bill  rate,  money  market  certificates  should 
11 For  a  detailed  description  of  the  actual  yield  calculation 
for  the  money  market  certificates  see  Kasriel  [7]. 
work  to  raise  the  growth  rate  of  total  small  time  and 
savings  deposits  consistent  with  any  given  market 
rate. 
Money  Market  Mutual  Funds  While  the  intro- 
duction  of money  market  certificates  is  a development 
that  should  decrease  disintermediation,  another  re- 
cent  development  should  work  to  increase  disinter- 
mediation.  This  development  is  the  emergence  of 
the  money  market  mutual  fund  as  a  major  financial 
market  institution.  Money  market  mutual  funds 
were  established  in  reaction  to  the  high  interest  rates 
of  1973-74.  Many  small  investors  were  prevented 
from  obtaining  high  market  yields  during  that  period 
because  they  lacked  sufficient  funds  to  meet  the  mini- 
mum  purchase  requirement  for  Treasury  bills,  let 
alone  the  much  larger  minimum  requirements  typical 
of  other  money  market  investments.12 
As  of  mid-1978  there  were  over  50  money  market 
mutual  funds  offering  shares  in  portfolios  of  various 
types  and  combinations  of  money  market  instru- 
ments.  Because  the  assets  of  these  funds  are  short- 
term,  the  yield  on  shares  in  them  tends  to  follow 
the  yield  on  current  money  market  instruments  with 
a  fairly  short  lag.  Minimum  purchase  requirements 
12 According  to  two  recent  studies,  Pyle  [8]  and  Hender- 
shott  [5],  the  loss  in  interest  to  the  small  saver  as  a 
result  of  binding  Regulation  Q  ceilings  in  the  three-year 
period  1973-7.5  was  $6  to  $9  billion. 
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$1000.  Consequently,  money  market  mutual  funds 
offer  the  opportunity  to  obtain  money  market  yields 
to  those  small  investors  who  previously  were  unable 
to  purchase  money  market  instruments.  As  market 
interest  rates  in  the  latter  part  of  1977  and  in  1978 
rose  relative  to  Regulation  Q  ceilings,  the  purchase 
of  money  market  mutual  fund  shares  expanded 
sharply.  About  $1  billion  were  purchased  every  two 
months  during  the  first  eight  months  of  1978.  The 
level  outstanding  as  of  August  was  $7.9  billion. 
Implications  for  Deposit  Growth  The  net  effect 
on  disintermediation  of  money  market  certificates 
and  money  market  mutual  funds  cannot  be  assessed 
with  certainty.  However,  in  view  of  the  huge  amount 
of  funds  that  have  shifted  from  the  deposit  institu- 
tions  into  the  Treasury  market  in  past  periods  of 
high  interest  rates,  it  seems  likely  that  the  positive 
effect  of  money  market  certificates  will  dominate  the 
negative  effect  of  money  market  funds.  If  so,  the 
growth  rate  of  total  small  time  and  savings  deposits 
will  be  less  variable  than  in  the  past.  One  conclusion 
that  can  be  made  with  a  fair  amount  of  certainty  is 
that  without  the  1978  revision  of  Regulation  Q,  the 
rapid  growth  of  money  market  mutual  funds  would 
have  caused  the  growth  of  small  time  and  savings 
deposits  to  fall  even  more  in  periods  of  rising  market 
rates  than  it  had  in  the  past. 
What  is  likely  to  be  the  relative  impact  of  the 
money  market  certificates  on  the  behavior  of  small 
time  and  savings  deposits  at  banks  versus  the  thrift 
institutions?  On  the  basis  of  the  survey  data  exam- 
ined  earlier,  it  can  be  expected  that,  due  to  the  25 
basis  point  differential,  these  certificates  will  have  a 
greater  impact  on  deposits  at  thrifts  than  at  banks. 
The  very  limited  amount  of  data  available  as  of  this 
writing  supports  this  expectation.  Federal  Reserve 
data  indicate  that  in  the  three  months  following  the 
introduction  of  the  certificates,  commercial  banks 
sold  $7.8  billion,  while  savings  and  loan  associations 
and  mutual  savings  banks  sold  $14  billion  and  $5 
billion,  respectively.  The  net  impact  on  the  growth 
rate  of  small  time  and  savings  deposits  was  also 
clearly  greater  at  the  thrift  institutions.  The  average 
annual  rate  of  growth  of  small  time  and  savings 
deposits  at  the  thrift  institutions  was  7.4  percent  in 
the  six  months  ending  May  1978.  In  the  following 
three  months  the  annualized  growth  rate  at  these 
institutions  rose  to  11.4  percent.  The  growth  rate  at 
banks,  however,  only  rose  from  5.1  to  5.3  percent  in 
the  same  period. 
The  expectation  that  thrifts  will  benefit  more  than 
banks  from  the  money  market  certificates  assumes 
that  the  thrifts  will  offer  them  at  the  maximum  rate. 
It  is  possible  that  at  certain  market  interest  rate 
levels  many  thrifts,  because  of the  long-term  maturity 
of  their  assets,  would  no  longer  be  willing  to  offer 
the  ceiling  rate.  In  such  a  case,  the  relative  impact 
of  the  certificates  on  banks  versus  thrifts  may  well 
shift  toward  banks. 
Large  Time  Deposits  as  a  Response  to  Disinter- 
mediation  Total  time  deposits  include  large  time 
deposits,  defined  as  those  greater  than  $100,000,  as 
well  as  the  smaller  time  and  savings  deposits  that 
have  been  discussed  to  this  point.  Regulation  Q 
ceilings  on  these  large  deposits  were  suspended  in 
June  1970  for  maturities  of  30  to  90  days  and  in  May 
1973  for  all  other  maturities.  The  surveys  discussed 
earlier  showed  S&L’s  with  only  $10.8  billion  of  these 
large  time  deposits  in  March  1978,  while  commercial 
banks  had  $164.9  billion  in  April  of  that  year. 
Since  the  early  1970’s,  sales  of  large  time  deposits 
by  banks  in  periods  of  high  interest  rates  have  more 
than  offset  declines  in  inflows  of  small  time  and 
savings  deposits.13  In  fact,  while  there  is  a  strong 
negative  correlation  from  1972  through  early  1978 
between  the  growth  rate  of  small  time  and  savings 
deposits  and  spreads  between  market  rates  and  Regu- 
lation  Q  ceilings,  there  is  actually  a  positive  correla- 
tion  between  the  growth  rate  of  total  time  and  sav- 
ings  deposits  and  market  rates  and  those  spreads. 
Until  recently  the  thrift  institutions  had  not  raised 
a  significant  amount  of  funds  through  large  time 
deposits.  Recent  FHLBB  surveys,  however,  show 
that  from  September  1977  through  March  1978, 
S&L’s  raised  $2.2  billion  dollars,  or  10.5  percent  of 
their  net  increase  of total  deposits,  through  large  time 
deposits.  This  was  the  highest  percentage  on  record 
and  indicates  that  some  thrift  institutions  are  in- 
creasing  the  use  of  large  time  deposits  not  subject 
to  Regulation  Q  ceilings  as  a  response  to  disinter- 
mediation. 
Regulation  Q  and  the  Monetary  Aggregates  To 
the  extent  that  the  1978  revision  of  Regulation  Q 
decreases  the  interest  sensitivity  of  small  time  and 
savings  deposits  at  banks  and  thrift  institutions,  the 
13 The  inverse  relationship  between  the  growth  of  small 
time  and  savings  deposits  and  the  growth  of  large  time 
deposits  is  shown  in  Cook  [3]. 
14 The  correlation  coefficient  between  the  growth  rate  of 
small  time  and  savings  deposits  and  the  spread  between 
the  6-month  bill  rate  and  the  ceiling  rate  on  6-month 
certificates  was  -.69  from  1972  I  through  1978  I.  The 
correlation  coefficient  between  the  growth  rate  of  total 
time  and  savings  deposits  and  the  spread  was  +.26  over 
the  same  period. 
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periods  of  high  market  interest  rates  will  be  affected. 
In  particular,  the  growth  rates  of  the  broader  aggre- 
gates  will  be  higher  relative  to  the  growth  rate  of  M1. 
Consequently,  a  given  M1  policy  rule  will  result  in  a 
more  rapid  growth  rate  of  the  broader  aggregates  in 
expansionary  periods.  This  has  become  a  cause  of 
concern  among  those  who  believe  the  broader  aggre- 
gates  are  more  appropriate  intermediate  targets  for 
monetary  policy  than  M1. 
Even  among  the  broader  aggregates,  relative 
growth  rates  are  likely  to  be  affected  by  the  money 
market  certificates.  In  particular,  in  periods  of  high 
market  rates,  the  certificates  probably  will  raise  the 
growth  rate  of  M5  relative  to  the  growth  rate  of M4 
and  also  the  growth  rate  of  M3  relative  to  M2.15 
This  will  occur  because  M5  and  M3  include  small 
time  and  savings  deposits  at  both  banks  and  the 
thrift  institutions,  while M2  and  M4  only  include 
those  deposits  at  banks.  Hence,  small  time  and 
savings  deposits  are  a  larger  component  of  M3  than 
of  M2  and  a  larger  component  of M5  than  of  M4.16 
stable  over  the  1968-78  period.  In  particular,  there 
appears  to  have  been  no  decrease  in  the  sensitivity  of 
the  demand  for  small  time  and  savings  deposits  to 
movements  in  short-term  interest  rates  following  the 
1973  change  in  Regulation  Q. 
The  1978  revision  of  Regulation  Q  introducing 
money  market  certificates  should  work  to  decrease 
the  sensitivity  of  total  small  time  and  savings  deposits 
to  market  interest  rates.  However,  other  recent  de- 
velopments,  especially  the  emergence  of  money  mar- 
ket  mutual  funds,  should  have  the  opposite  effect. 
While  the  net  impact  of  these  developments  is  uncer- 
tain,  the  evidence  to  date  suggests  that  the  growth  of 
small  time  and  savings  deposits  following  the  intro- 
duction  of  the  money  market  certificates  has  been 
greater  than  in  past  periods  of  comparable  spreads 
between  money  market  rates  and  Regulation  Q  ceil- 
ings.  To  the  extent  that  the  money  market  certificates 
affect  the  interest  sensitivity  of  total  small  time  and 
savings  deposits,  the  relative  growth‘  rates  of  the 
monetary  aggregates  in  periods  of  rising  interest 
rates  will  be  different  than  in  the  past. 
Summary  This  article  has  examined  the  impact 
of  Regulation  Q  ceiling  interest  rates  on  the  behavior 
of  small  time  and  savings  deposits  at  banks  and  the 
thrift  institutions.  It  has  attempted  to  show  the  close 
relationship  that  exists  between  movements  in  market 
interest  rates  around  these  ceilings  and  movements 
in  small  time  and  savings  deposits.  This  relationship 
shows  up  clearly  in  the  Federal  Reserve  and  Federal 
Home  Loan  Bank  Board  survey  data  as  well  as  in 
the  aggregate  deposit  data.  The  relationship  between 
the  aggregate  growth  rate  of  small  time  and  savings 
deposits  and  movements  in  short-term  interest  rates 
relative  to  Regulation  Q  ceiling  rates  appears  quite 
15 M2  equals  M1  plus  small  time  and  savings  deposits  at 
banks  plus  large  time  deposits  at  banks  other  than  negoti- 
able  CD’s at  weekly  reporting  banks;  M4  equals  M2  plus 
those  large  time  deposits  not  included  in  M2,  about  half 
of  the  total;  and  M3  equals  M2  plus  time  and  savings 
deposits  at  the  thrifts  plus  credit  union  shares.  M5 
equals  M3  plus  negotiable  CD’s  at  weekly  reporting 
banks. 
16 Specifically,  the  interest  elasticity  (a  measure  of  the 
responsiveness  to  a  change  in  interest  rates)  of  any  of 
the  monetary  aggregates  equals  a  weighted  average  of 
the  elasticity  of  its  components,  where  the  weight  as- 
signed  each  component  is  its  proportion  of  the  total 
aggregate.  If  the  impact  of  the  money  market  certificates 
on  the  interest  elasticity  of  small  time  and  savings  de- 
posits  at  banks  and  the  thrift  institutions  is  the  same, 
then  the  interest  elasticity  of  M3  would  decrease  relative 
to  that  of  M2  simply  because  the  share  of  small  time  and 
savings  deposits  in  M2  is  less  than  that  is  M3.  If  the 
interest  elasticity  of  small  time  and  savings  deposits 
drops  more  at  thrifts  than  at  banks  as  a  result  of  the 
certificates,  then  the  interest  elasticity  of  M3  would  de- 
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THE  DEMAND  FOR  SMALL  TIME  AND  SAVINGS  DEPOSITS 
This  Appendix  first  estimates  a  demand  equation 
for  total  small  time  and  savings  deposits.  The  equa- 
tion  is  subsequently  used  to  test  the  hypothesis  that 
the  introduction  of  longer  maturity  time  deposits  in 
1973-74  succeeded  in  reducing  the  interest  sensi- 
tivity  of  the  demand  for  small  time  and  savings  de- 
posits.  The  following  stock  adjustment  model  was 
specified  in  logarithmic  form  : 
(1)  log  STSD  -  log  STSD-1  =  (log  STSD* 
-  log  STSD-1) 
where  STSD  is  the  actual  level  of  small  time  and 
savings  deposits  at  banks  and  the  thrift  institutions 
and  STSD*  is  the  public’s  desired  level.  The  change 
in  STSD  in  any  period  is  specified  as  a  function  of 
the  difference  between  the  desired  and  actual  levels 
of  STSD  and  the  speed  of  adjustment  parameter 
The  desired  level  of  small  time  and  savings  de- 
posits  is  specified  as  a  function  of  the  spread  between 
the  six-month  bill  rate  and  the  maximum  rate  on 
three-  to,  twelve-month  certificates  at  banks  (SPR) 
and  GNP  (Y)  : 
(2)  STSD*  =  aebsprYc 
Substituting  for  STSD*  in  the  stock  adjustment 
equation,  we  get 
(3)  log  STSD  =  log  a  +  b SPR  +  c  log  Y 
+  (l-  )log STSD-1 
This  specification,  which  was  chosen  on  the  basis  of 
the  information  in  Chart  4,  constrains  the  growth 
rate  of  small  time  and  savings  deposits  to  be  a  linear 
function  of  the  yield  spread.  The  coefficient,  c,  is  an 
estimate  of  the  income  elasticity  of  the  demand  for 
small  time  and  savings  deposits. 
The  regression  results  are  reported  in  the  Table. 
Equation  (A)  is the  basic  equation  (3)  above,  Equa- 
tion  (B)  adds  dummy  variables  for  the  temporary 
impact  of  the  tax  rebates,  REB,  in  mid-1975  on  the 
holdings  of  small  time  and  savings  deposits.  The 
equations  are  estimated  using  ordinary  least  squares. 
The  coefficients  all  have  the  expected  signs  and  are 
significant  at  the  5  percent  level.  In  particular, 
the  interest  rate  spread  variable  exerts  the  expected 
negative  influence  on  the  demand  for  small  time  and 
savings  deposits  and  has  a  very  high  t-statistic.  The 
speed  of  adjustment  and  income  elasticity  estimates 
will  be  discussed  below. 
The  hypothesis  that  the  interest  sensitivity  of  the 
demand  for  small  time  and  savings  deposits  changed 
in  the  latter  half  of  the  period  was  tested  by  adding 
the  following  variable  to  the  equation: 
Q  =  DUM •  SPR, 
where  DUM  =  0  1968  II  to  1973  II 
=  1  1973 III  to  1978  I 
If  the  coefficient  of  Q  is  positive  and  significantly 
different  from  zero,  then  the  conclusion  can  be  made 
that  the  interest  sensitivity  of  the  demand  for  small 
time  and  savings  deposits  is  less  in  the  latter  half  of 
the  period.  Equation  (C)  in  the  Table  adds  Q  to 
Equation  (B).  The  regression  results  show  a  coeffi- 
cient  of  Q  that  is  positive,  but  very  small  and  not 
Dependent 
Variable 
(A)  log  STSD 
(B)  log  STSD 
(C)  log  STSD 
REGRESSION  RESULTS:  THE  DEMAND  FOR  SMALL  TIME  AND  SAVINGS  DEPOSITS 
log 
Constant  SPR  log  Y  STSD-1  REB  REB-1  SE  h  Q 
-.4152  -  .0089  .2250  .8144  .9997  .0052  1.45 
(5.11)  (12.81)  (5.02)  (21.07) 
-  .2866  -  .0085 
(3.66)  (14.10) 
-  .2659  -  .0090 
(3.18)  (10.59) 
.1569  .8716  .0096 
(3.65)  (23.66)  (1.99) 
.1489  .8775  .0098 
(3.34)  (23.15)  (2.02) 
.0169  .9998  .0045  1.42 
(3.48) 
.0167  .0008  .9998  .0045  1.45 
(3.42)  (.74) 
Note:  The  spread  is  expressed  in  percentage  points  and  the  variables  are  measured  in  billions;  t-statistics  ore  in  parentheses.  The 
Treasury  bill  and  deposit  rates  ore  both  calculated  on  an  effective  annual  basis. 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RlCHMOND  27 significantly  different  from  zero.  Hence,  they  offer  no 
support  for  the  view  that  the  1973  changes  in  Regu- 
lation  Q  reduced  the  sensitivity  of  the  demand  for 
small  time  and  savings  deposits  to  movements  in 
short-term  rates  relative  to  Regulation  Q  ceiling 
rates. 
The  speed  of  adjustment  implied  by  the  coefficients 
of  STSD-l  are  .l86  in  Equation  (A),  .128  in  Equa- 
tion  (B),  and  .122  in  Equation  (C).  The  estimates 
of  the  income  elasticity  (the  coefficient  of  Y  divided 
by  the  estimate  of  )  are  within  a  narrow  range  of 
1.21  to  1.23.  The  estimates  of  the  speed  of  adjust- 
ment  and  the  income  elasticity  should  be  viewed  with 
caution  since  they  are  determined  by  the  coefficients 
of  log  STSD-l  and  log  Y.  These  two  variables  are 
highly  correlated  over  the  period. 
The  last  column  in  the  Table  reports  Durbin’s  h- 
statistic,  which  is  used  to  test  for  serial  correlation  in 
the  presence  of  a  lagged  dependent  variable.  The 
hypothesis  of  zero  autocorrelation  can  not  be  rejected 
at  the  5  percent  significance  level.  It  can,  however, 
be  rejected  at  the  10 percent  level.  The  equations  in 
the  Table  were  re-estimated  using  the  Cochrane- 
Orcutt  procedure.  The  coefficients  all  were  very 
close  to  those  reported  in  the  Table.  In  particular 
the  coefficient  of  Q  was  little  changed. 
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